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B.

PARISER*

INTRODUCTION

Since the early 1970s, considerable controversy has surrounded the Department
of the Interior's program for leasing publicly-owned coal lands to private mining
companies for development. As a result, there have been two moratoriums on the
issuance of new federal coal leases, the first spanning the decade of the 1970s, the
second from 1983 to the present. In addition, major legislative changes have occurred
and, in 1983, the Congressional Commission on Fair Market Value Policy for Federal
Coal Leasing was established.' Following the conclusion of a two-year departmental
review of coal leasing policies and procedures in February 1986, the Secretary of the
Interior unveiled a new federal coal leasing program, indicating that the earliest probable date for resuming competitive leasing would be in late 1987.2
In the recent moratorium, as in the earlier one covering the 1970s, federal coal
leasing has been limited to emergency or noncompetitive situations. As administered

* Assistant Professor of Economics and Business, The Catholic University of America; Professional Staff, United States General Accounting Office, Washington, D.C.; B.S. 1964, West Virginia
University; M.S. 1968, Southern Illinois University; Ph.D. 1970, Southern Illinois University.
The views expressed in this Article are those of the author and not necessarily those of the
General Accounting Office.
' See REPORT OF THE COMM'N ON FAIR MARKET VALUE POLICY FOR FEDERAL COAL LEASING (Feb.

1984) [hereinafter cited as REPORT OF THE CommIN]. Congress established the Commission on Fair
Market Value Policy For Federal Coal Leasing by enacting the Supplemental Appropriations Act of
1983, Pub. L. No. 98-63, 97 Stat. 301, 328, signed into law by President Reagan on July 30, 1983.
The purpose of the Commission was to study the federal coal management program and resolve
controversies surrounding the Interior Department's coal leasing procedures to ensure receipt of fair
market value. The controversies arose from criticisms of the Interior Department procedures and the
April and October 1982 federal coal lease sales in Montana and Wyoming, in an area known as the
Powder River Basin. The key controversy was that, by design or through incompetence, the Government had realized less than fair market value on the sale of coal leases to lands containing about
1.6 billion tons of federal coal, at a total lease price of $67 million. See infra note 118.
2 DOI, SECRETARIAL IssuE DocUME T: FED. COAL MGMT. PRos
(1986) [hereinafter cited as
FED. COAL Mctr. PROORAM (1986)]; DOI, News Release, Interior Department to Resume Federal
Coal Leasing Program (Feb. 26, 1986).
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under the Interior Department's emergency leasing process, such leasing serves two
objectives: (1)maintaining current production levels of existing mines where operations
are heavily dependent on the acquisition of adjacent federal coal lands, thus avoiding
mining disruptions and premature mine closing, and (2) preventing operating mines
from bypassing, or mining around, unleased federal coal deposits that are unlikely
to be mined by another company in the foreseeable future.3
This Article discusses recent issues relating to the administration of emergency
federal coal leasing under the Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act of 1976
("FCLAA"). 4 Basically, the law makes no distinction between leasing to promote the
development of new competitive mining operations and leasing to meet emergency
needs of existing operations. The former type of leasing is essentially competitive, as
envisioned by the law, while the latter is noncompetitive and not specifically covered
under the law. In light of the uncertainty and controversy surrounding the competitive
coal leasing program, emergency leasing very well could emerge as the primary type
of federal coal leasing.
II.

TBE FEDERAL COAL MANAGEMENT PROGRAM

Federal coal lands account for a significant portion of the country's known coal
reserves.3 Federal lands contain about sixty percent of western coal reserves and an
estimated thirty percent of total domestic coal reserves. In addition, the federal
government influences about twenty percent of nonfederal western coal because many
of the western coal areas are characterized by intermingled ownership patterns. Production from federal coal lands in 1985 amounted to 162 million tons, accounting
for more than fifty percent of western coal production and about twelve percent
6
of total United States coal production.
The Department of the Interior's Federal Coal Management Regulations incorporate provisions of FCLAA and other laws protecting the environment and
controlling surface mining and reclamation activities. The regulations, initially issued
in 1979 and revised several times since then, 7 establish a comprehensive leasing program for conveying federal coal lands to private mining companies by competitive
bidding. These regulations provide for two components of the leasing system: normal
competitive leasing and leasing-by-application.
Normal competitive leasing is the primary mechanism through which the Interior
Department makes federal coal available to private mining companies. Under this
47 Fed. Reg. 33,124 (1982).
4 Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act of 1976, 30 U.S.C. § 201 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
' See BuR. op LAND MomT.; DOI, FNAL ENvrL. STATEMENT, FED. CoAL MOMT. PRoORAM 2-1
(Apr. 1979) [hereinafter cited as FiNAL ENVmL. STATEMENT (Apr. 1979)].
6 DOI, FED. CoAL MGT. REP.: FIscAL YEAR 1985 at 1 (May 13, 1986) [hereinafter cited as
FED. CoAL MomT. REP.: FIscAL YEAR 1985].
44 Fed. Reg. 42,584-652 (1979); 47 Fed. Reg. 33,114-51 (1982); and 51 Fed. Reg. 18,884-88
3

(1986).
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component, the Interior Department establishes schedules within designated federal
coal production regions 8 for leasing specific tracts of its choosing. Coal program
activities in each region are guided by a Regional Coal Team, 9 an advisory group
chartered under the Federal Advisory Committee Act. 0 Team members include the
Governors of states in the region involved and officials of the Interior Department's
Bureau of Land Management ("BLM") in the states.
Before any decision is made to hold a regional lease sale, the Interior Department, through the Regional Coal Teams, must complete several coal activity planning
tasks. These tasks include assessing the need for leasing, screening coal company
expressions of leasing interest in specific tracts, establishing (i.e., delineating) boundaries of proposed lease tracts, appraising individual lease tracts, preparing comprehensive environmental impact statements covering lands proposed for leasing, and
selecting a limited number of tracts from the lands considered for leasing.
The competitive leasing process takes about three to five years to complete before
a regional lease sale is held. From 1981 through 1985, forty-six federal coal leases
were sold at regional sales.
Table 1
FEDERAL COAL LEASES SOLD IN REGIONAL SALES'
1981-1984

Year

Number of
Tracts

Acres

Total
Recoverable
Reserves
(Mil. Tons)

1981
1982
1983
1984

24
19
2
1

42,352
28,312
6,421
4,999

326.3
1,677.0
82.1
36.7

$ 27,540,486
95,964,705
706,310
9,542,041

Total

46

82,084

2,122.1

$ 133,753,542

Total High
Bonus Bids

' These sales are the result of coal activity planning in designated Federal Coal
Regions. These figures do not include emergency or lease by application sales.
Source: DOI, Federal Coal Management Report: Fiscal Year 1985 at 41 (May 13,
1986).
The second component, leasing-by-application, allows the Interior Department to
respond to a need for federal coal at specific locations more rapidly than the normal

44 Fed. Reg. 65,196-97 (1979).
44 Fed. Reg. 42,612.
105 U.S.C. App. §§ 1-17 (Supp. If 1984). The authority to create these committees within the
Bureau of Land Management is codified at 43 C.F.R. § 1784 (1986).
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competitive leasing process permits. These locations include coal lands in designated
federal coal production regions where a producing mining operation can demonstrate
a need for unleased federal coal in accordance with emergency leasing criteria included
in the Federal Coal Management Regulations." These criteria are intentionally restrictive in that they were designed to limit leasing to legitimate emergencies while
preventing potential lessees from circumventing the competitive leasing process by
2
submitting emergency applications.
In addition to emergency situations, the Interior Department conducts leasingby-application outside designated federal coal production regions where federal coal
deposits are limited and scattered. In these areas, it is not cost-effective to conduct
extensive land-use and activity planning before holding a lease sale. Emergency criteria
do not apply in these areas and unlimited amounts of federal coal may be leased to
any applicant.
From 1978 through mid-1986, fifty-nine coal federal leases were sold in lease-byapplication sales. Of the fifty-nine, fifty were emergency leases and nine were leasesby-application outside designated federal coal regions.
Table 2
FEDERAL COAL LEASES SOLD THROUGH LEASING-BY-APPLICATION
FROM 1978 TO MID-1986

Year

Number of
Tracts

Acres

Total
Recoverable
Reserves
(Mil. Tons)

1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986

6
9
9
8
7
4
1
10
5

2,351
6,352
3,744
4,852
2,801
697
78
5,849
3,206

13.0
65.5
18.1
69.7
12.8
2.3
.7
23.0
21.0

59

29,930

226.1

Total

Total High
Bonus Bids
$

132,094
295,272
440,773
1,033,553
2,774,803
357,918
7,951
1,857,241
1,106,323

$ 8,005,928

' Includes 50 emergency leases and 9 leases-by-application outside designated Federal
Coal Regions.
Source: DOI, Federal Coal Management Report (various years).

See FjNAL EivTL. STATEMENT (Apr. 1979), supra note 5, at 3-67 to -3-68.
n Id. at 3-67.
"
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III.

TBE

HISTORY OF EMERGENCY FEDERAL COAL LEASING POLICY

Emergency coal leasing has evolved from a temporary measure in the early
1970s to a major component of today's federal coal leasing program. From a
public policy perspective, the history of emergency coal leasing policy provides
insight into the administrative and legislative events shaping the economic and
regulatory environment currently governing the emergency leasing process.
The Department of the Interior, under the Mineral Lands Leasing Act of
1920,13 has the responsibility for leasing federal coal deposits to private mining
companies for development. Prior to 1970, the Interior Department's coal leasing
policy was reactive; coal lands were leased in a haphazard fashion to almost
anyone who sought a lease.' 4 Between 1955 and 1970, the general practice of the
Bureau of Land Management was to issue federal coal leases without much consideration to the total coal reserves under lease, the need for additional leasing
15
and production, and the environmental impact of leasing.
A 1970 BLM study reported that leased coal acreage on public lands in six
western states-Colorado, New Mexico, North Dakota, Montana, Utah, and Wyoming-rose sharply from about 80,000 acres in 1945 to more than 780,000 in
1970, but that federal lease production declined from 10 million tons of coal to
7.4 million tons during the same period.1 6 Furthermore, the BLM report noted
that less than ten percent of the total leased acreage was producing coal. In May
1971, in response to the 1970 BLM report, Secretary of the Interior Rogers B.
Morton took a series of informal actions that resulted in a moratorium on all
federal coal leasing and prospecting permits.' 7 In February 1973, Secretary Morton
replaced the informal moratorium with a new federal coal leasing policy that
embraced both long-term and short-term actions. 8 The short-term actions marked
the beginning of an emergency federal coal leasing policy.
A.

Secretary Morton's Short-Term Leasing Policy

Secretary Morton's short-term action consisted of the establishment of interim
leasing criteria until a new competitive leasing program was developed. The criteria
were used for ensuring that applications from coal companies constituted a legitimate short-term need for federal coal. This marked the first time the Interior

Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 1920, 30 U.S.C. §§ 181 to -287 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
J.G. LArros, NATURAL RESOURCES LAWv 297 (1985).
1 DOI, SECRETARIAL IssUE Doct mIT: FED. COAL McMT. PROGRAm (1979) [hereinafter cited
as FED. COAL Mohrr. PROGRAM (1979)].
36 BUR. OF LAND MGMT., HOLDINGS AND DEVELOPMENT OF FED. COAL LEASES (Nov. 1970).
"

"

See 1 FED. COAL MGMT. PROGRAM (1979), supra note 15, at 1.
Ebzery & Kunz, Federal Coal Leasing in the 1980's: Lessons Learned from the 1970's, 28
RocKY MT. MN. L. INST. 315 (1983).
'

"
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Department adopted a policy to ensure that production at existing mines could
continue until a new competitive coal leasing program was developed. All coal
lease applications, including preference right lease applications, were to be reviewed on a case-by-case basis in accordance with the following criteria:
(a) the coal is needed to maintain an existing mining operation, or
(b) coal is needed as a reserve for production in the near future; and in all cases
(c) the land to be mined will be reclaimed in accordance with lease stipulations
that will provide for environmental protection and land reclamation, and
(d) where required by the National Environmental Policy Act, an environmental
impact statement covering the proposed lease has been prepared. 19
In July 1973, BLM directed its field offices to implement Secretary Morton's
short-term leasing policy. 20 The instructions called for leasing decisions to be based
on sufficient indications that a prospective applicant needed coal to satisfy an
existing market and intended to begin development within three years.
In May 1974, BLM released a draft programmatic environmental impact statement describing the Energy Minerals Allocation Recommendation System
("EMARS"9 ). 2 1 The purpose of EMARS was to enable the Interior Department
to resume competitive leasing through a market-oriented mechanism that would
,help establish an environmentally acceptable program. BLM released the final
environmental impact statement ("EIS") with some modifications. 22 A noticeable
change was the renaming of the preferred program, to Energy Minerals Activity
Recommendation System. A controversial aspect of the EMARS program was
that it relied upon industry and public nominations to identify tracts for meeting
coal development needs from federal lands.
Shortly after the adoption of EMARS as departmental policy, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Hughes was filed in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia alleging that the final EIS was legally inadequate.? The plaintiffs argued that the statement was defective because of its
failure to: (1) Sufficiently describe the EMARS program and disclose reasons for
the changes in the program between the draft and final EISs; (2) adequately
consider the need for leasing more federal coal; (3) fully discuss the environmental
impacts; and (4) sufficiently consider energy conservation and alternative sources
of energy.

19Id.
20BuR. OF LAND MGTr., INSTRUCTIONAL MEMORANDUM 72-231 (July 6, 1973).
21 See BU. OF LAND MomT., DRAFT ENvTL. IMPACT STATEMENT, PROPOSED COAL LEASING PROGRAM (1974).
See BuR. or LAND MGMT., FINAL ENvTL. IMPACT STATEMENT, PROPOSED COAL LEASING PROGRAM

(1975).
13Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Hughes, 437 F. Supp. 981 (D.D.C. 1977) (mem.),

amended, 454 F. Supp. 148 (1978).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol89/iss3/4

6

Pariser: Current Issues Relating to Emergency Federal Coal Leasing
1987]

B.

EMERGENCY FEDERAL COAL LEASING

Secretary Kleppe's Revisions to Short-Term Leasing Policy

In 1976, the Interior Department made two adjustments to its short-term
leasing policy. In January, Secretary Thomas Kleppe announced that the Department would retain Secretary Morton's short-term leasing policy until the new
competitive leasing system (i.e., EMARS) was fully operational and the leasing
moratorium lifted. 24 A month later, in February 1976, Secretary Kleppe informed
BLM that it should process preference right leases that complied with short-term
leasing criteria until new regulations governing preference right leases were issued.
These regulations were issued in May 1976, and allowed preference right leasing
without regard to short-term criteria. 25Thus, from that date until July 1977, shortterm leasing criteria applied only to leases offered at public auctions while preference right leases could be issued without limitation.
C.

New Legislation Affecting Federal Coal Policy

From 1974 through 1977, while the Interior Department was developing a
long-term coal leasing policy, Congress was investigating the Department's management of public lands and its coal leasing activities under the Mineral Lands
Leasing Act of 1920. Congressional hearings focused on the alleged speculative
holding of federal coal leases acquired noncompetitively through preference right
lease applications, the adequacy of financial returns to the public, environmental
protection, and public participation. Under the 1920 Act, the Secretary of the
Interior had broad discretionary authority to offer federal coal deposits for lease
sale to qualified applicants. The Secretary was authorized to award federal coal
leases by the use of competitive bidding or such other methods as adopted by
general regulation. About half of all the federal coal leases issued through 1970
were awarded noncompetitively without the government receiving any bonus bids.
In August 1976, over President Ford's veto, Congress enacted the Federal
Coal Leasing Amendments Act of 1976 ("FCLAA"). 2 6 The FCLAA, among other
provisions, abolished all noncompetitive leasing. 27 The Act required that new federal coal leases be awarded through competitive bidding and that no lease be

DOI, Office of the Secretary, Memorandum (Jan. 26, 1976).
- 43 C.F.R. § 3520.1-1 (1976).
30 U.S.C. §§ 181 to -287.
27 Two exceptions are permitted from the requirement of competitive bidding. The first exception
is a provision allowing a modification to an existing lease of up to 160 acres, not resulting in a lease
sale nor issuance of a new lease. Id. at § 203. The second exception is a provision allowing the Interior
Department to sell federal coal, based on a negotiated fair market value, the removal of which is
necessary and incidental to the exercise of a right of way permit. Id. at § 201(a)(1). FCLAA also
abolished the issuance of prospecting permits and preference right leases for coal. However, valid
existing preference right lease applications issued prior to the enactment of FCLAA were not affected.
Competitive bidding means that otherwise qualified potential bidders cannot be prevented from
bidding by limiting participation at public lease sale auctions to a particular class of potential bidders.
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issued at a price less than fair market value, as determined by the Secretary.29
In addition, FCLAA did not distinguish between leasing to encourage the development .of new competitive mining operations and leasing to meet short-term,
or noncompetitive, needs of existing mines. The former type of leasing is essentially competitive, as envisioned by the Act, while the latter form of leasing, which
the Interior Department has been conducting since the early 1970s, is noncompetitive and not covered under the Act. Further, FCLAA established no authority
to allow the Secretary of the Interior to negotiate fair market value in leasing
situations in which competitive bidding procedures are not appropriate. Since the
enactment of FCLAA, there has been considerable debate concerning the effects
of its provisions on federal coal leases acquired before FCLAA.1'
In addition to FCLAA, Congress enacted the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976.31 The Act requires BLM and the Interior Department to
ensure that all resource development decisions related to public lands, including
coal leasing, are made in cooperation with state and local governments as part
of a comprehensive planning process.
In 1977, Congress enacted the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act
("SMCRA"). 3 2 SMCRA requires the Secretary of the Interior to review public
lands to determine whether they contain areas unsuitable for all, or only certain
types, of surface coal mining operations. In addition, section 714 of SMCRA,
protection of qualified surface owners, prohibits the Secretary of the Interior from
leasing any federal coal underlying privately-owned surfaces for surface mining
until the surface owner's written consent has been obtained.
Subsequent to the enactment of FCLAA, the Interior Department, in May
1977, promulgated revised coal leasing regulations describing the EMARS coal
leasing program and incorporating the requirements of FCLAA.13 The regulations
included revised short-term leasing criteria similar to those included in the 1973
BLM instructional memorandum. The criteria required applicants for short-term
coal leases to demonstrate that the coal was needed to maintain an existing mine
or as a reserve for maintaining near term production. However, the regulations
did not require the applicant to begin mining within three years, as provided
under the 1973 criteria.

30 U.S.C. § 201(a)(1).
" See Humphreys, Existing FederalLeaseholds-How Strong is the Hold?, 25 ROCKY MT. MIN.
L. INST. 5-1 (1979); Ebzery & Kunz, supra note 18.

11Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701 to -1784 (1982 & Supp.
III 1985).
32 Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201 to -1328 (1982 &
Supp. III 1985).
33 43 C.F.R. § 3525 (1977).
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Secretary Andrus' Revisions to Short-Term Leasing Criteria

Under the Carter Administration, the Interior Department developed a new
coal leasing program in which emergency leasing played a major role. On July
25, 1977, Secretary of the Interior Cecil Andrus revised the short-term leasing
criteria.3 4 The memorandum explaining the Secretary's decision states that neither
the 1973 BLM instructions nor Secretary Morton's short-term leasing policy placed
any limitation on the amount of acreage or reserves which could be included in
a short-term lease. 35 Secretary Morton's policy allowed the Interior Department
to grant a lease of any size, provided the applicant could begin operations within
three years. The critical factor was the time at which production was to commence,
not the size of the lease. The memorandum provided the following rationale for
revising Secretary Morton's short-term policy:
While, in general, the short-term criteria have served their intended purpose, alleviation of particular coal supply problems during the consideration of a revised
coal program, the short-term standards adopted by Secretary Morton are subject
to "abuse" because they do not contain any limits on the amount of reserves
that can be included in a lease. The original short-term standards serve not only
their intended function of alleviating short-term problems but also serve to satisfy
long-term needs.
Satisfaction of long-term needs under the short-term system is undesirable. To
eliminate the possibility of abuse of short-term leasing and to ensure that only
situations are issued, I recommend revising the
leases for legitimate 3short-term
6
short-term standards.
The short-term policy adopted by Secretary Andrus contained separate criteria
for existing mines and for new mine openings. Existing mines, awarded leases by
competitive bidding, and noncompetitive preference right lease applicants had to
meet the following criteria:
(1) Federal coal reserves are needed to give a contiguous mining area of an operating mine a reserve of coal that can meet contracted-for rates of production
for the next 8 years or expected rates of production for the next 8 years
whichever is higher; or
(2) the Federal lease area sought is so small, or so located in relation to an
operating mine on adjacent lands that failure to issue 3a7 lease will preclude
mining of the Federal reserve in the foreseeable future.
On the other hand, applicants requesting lease sales for new mine openings
were subject to the short-term criteria:

14DOI, Office of the Secretary, Memorandum, Short-Term Leasing Standards (July 25, 1977).
11Id. at 1.
36 Id. at 2.
37 Id.
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The Department may grant short-term applications for competitive or preference
right leases for new mines to serve existing power plants or other existing coal
users if the new mine can be operated, related facilities constructed, and the coal
delivered without the construction of major new transportation facilities.

Leases issued under this criteria shall require the lessee to submit a complying
mining and reclamation plan within one year from lease issuance and to begin
mine development within six months from the date of approval of the mining
plan. The lease would automatically terminate if those conditions were not met.
The lease may be issued for no more than 8 years of reserves at contracted-for
or expected levels of production, and must form, with lands already controlled
by the applicant, an economic mining unit.,,

E. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Hughes: Court Order and
Short-Term Criteria
On September 27, 1977, the United States District Court for the District of

Columbia ruled in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Hughes"9 that the
Department of the Interior's 1975 final EIS for a new program was inadequate.

The court found that the Interior Department had violated the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 in formulating and adopting EMARS as its new
coal leasing program. As a result, the court ordered the Interior Department not
to implement the EMARS leasing program. It also ordered the Department to
evaluate its coal leasing policy and to develop a new EIS for deciding whether
there was a need to implement a new program. The court, however, allowed the
Interior Department to conduct short-term leasing, subject to strict criteria, until
a new program was adopted. The court imposed two short-term leasing criteria:
(1) the proposed coal lease was needed to maintain an existing coal supply contract, and (2) the amount of coal leased was not to exceed three years of production.40
Like short-term criteria previously established by the Interior Department, the
court's criteria clearly limited leasing to noncompetitive situations. The court order
subsequently was amended to allow more leasing. 41 In short, the criteria had the

Id. at 2-3.
3Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 981.
10Id. at 993-94. The court did not adopt the Interior Department's July 25, 1977, revised shortterm criteria. It rejected the criteria on the grounds that the criteria allowed the Department to award

preference right leases without meeting the otherwise applicable requirements of the criteria for shortterm leases.
4" Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., v. Hughes, 454 F. Supp. 148 (D.D.C. 1978). The
amended order permitted the Interior Department to lease limited amounts of reserves to existing

mining operations for meeting binding contracts and for maintaining production for up to eight years.
The amended order also allowed the Department to lease up to five years of reserves to an adjacent
operator to avoid the bypass or loss of federal coal unlikely to be mined by another operator.
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effect of precluding competition at lease sales since existing operators requesting
the lease for adjacent lands had a clear competitive advantage over other potential
bidders.
F. Adoption of the Federal Coal Management Program and Establishment of
Emergency Leasing
On April 30, 1979, the Interior Department issued a final EIS for a new coal
leasing program called the Federal Coal Management Program. 42 The program
embraced emergency leasing as a major component, set apart from the normal
competitive leasing process. Emergency leasing was governed by criteria designed
to maintain the integrity of the competitive leasing process. 43 This marked the
first time the Interior Department recognized emergency leasing as a major type
of leasing rather than as an interim measure.
Within the framework of the Federal Coal Management Program, emergency
leasing had the following goals:
(1) To serve as the leasing process outside the western federal coal production
regions-i.e., mid-western and eastern coal production regions-where limited
federal coal ownership makes full-scale planning impractical;
(2) to prevent the bypass of federal coal, unemployment due to mine disruption, or coal contract failures;
(3) to prevent prospective operators from opening mines on insufficient private holdings and then forcing the federal government into granting emergency
leases because of resulting bypass or unemployment possibilities; and
(4) to avoid issuing multiple emergency leases for the same operation prior
to consideration under the activity planning procedures. 44
After adopting the Federal Coal Management Program, the Interior Department issued final regulations in July 1979 governing competitive coal leasing45
and emergency leasing." The emefgency leasing regulations contained several criteria which required the following: (1) The applicant had to demonstrate a shortterm need for federal coal either to maintain production of an existing mine at
its current annual rate of production, or to avoid the bypass of coal unlikely to
be mined by another operator in the foreseeable future; (2) some portion of the
tract had to be mined within three years; (3) the need for the coal had to result
from circumstances beyond the applicant's control; (4) the amount of coal leased

,2 See FINAL ENVTL. STATEM.!ENT (Apr. 1979), supra note 5.
' 2 FED. CoAL MANAG4MENT PROGRAM (1979), supra note 15, at 95.
"
4
46

Id. at 115-16.
43 C.F.R. §§ 3420.0-1 to -3422.4 (1980).
Id. at §§ 3425.0-2 to -3425.5.
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could not exceed eight years of recoverable reserves, based on the applicant's
production rate; (5) no more than one emergency lease could be issued to the
same operation; and (6) the successful bidder had to meet the emergency criteria.47
Thus, despite the statutory requirement of competitive bidding, the criteria limited
bidding to the applicant requesting the emergency lease sale.
In developing the emergency regulations, the Interior Department sought to
curb potential abuses of the competitive leasing program. The preamble to the
July 1979 regulations stated the following:
Although it does not appear as a part of the rulemaking, the Secretary of
the Interior has adopted a policy to discourage a company very strongly from

opening a mine which has insufficient reserves to operate successfully unless it
subsequently obtains a Federal coal lease upon application under this subpart.
This policy will be enforced by the Department of the Interior. . . in the exercise

of the Secretary of the Interior's discretion not to lease in response to any coal
lease application. As an example .... any application may be rejected if leasing
in response to the application would violate the normal competitive leasing process
....All potential lessees of Federal coal should be aware that attempts to pres-

sure the Department to lease by opening a mine with insufficient reserves will be
unsuccessful.' 8
G. Secretary Watt and Emergency Leasing Policy
Shortly after the Reagan Administration assumed office, Secretary of the Interior James G. Watt, in April 1981, initiated a comprehensive review of the
federal coal management program "to identify opportunities to streamline the
existing rules and ultimately to make the leasing process more efficient." ' 49
On November 13, 1981, Secretary Watt approved several proposed changes
to the coal leasing regulations issued by the previous administration. 0 With regard
to emergency leasing criteria, Secretary Watt approved the elimination of three
restrictions: (1) The requirement that the applicant must have been in production
for two years prior to application; (2) the provision limiting a mining operation
to one emergency lease; and (3) the restriction of bidding to those able to show
an emergency need for the coal."'

Id. at § 3425.1-4.
4144 Fed. Reg. 42,594 (1979).
,1DOI, Office of the Secretary, Memorandum, Revisions to Fed. Coal Management Rules (43
CFR 3400) and Coal Exploration and Mining Operations Rules (30 CFR 211) (Oct. 26, 1981) at I
[hereinafter cited as Memorandum (Oct. 26, 1981)]; see DOI, Office the Secretary, Memorandum,
Federal Coal Leasing Program Review (Apr. 20, 1981).
10DOI, Office of the Secretary, Decision Sheet at F-2 (Nov. 13, 1981) (attachment to Memorandum (Oct. 26, 1981)) [hereinafter cited as Decision Sheet].
1' Memorandum (Oct. 26, 1981), supra note 49, at 8-9; and Decision Sheet at F-2.
47
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On December 16, 1981, the Interior Department issued proposed regulations
including the above changes to the emergency leasing criteria approved by Secretary WattA2 The purpose of the emergency leasing process, however, remained
unchanged. It was to be used only in situations when the need for coal could
53
not be timely accommodated under the normal competitive leasing process.
The Interior Department issued final regulations on July 30, 1982, containing
the previously discussed changes to the emergency leasing criteria.5 4 According to
the preamble, several commenters opposed the elimination of the criterion which
required applicants to have been mining coal for two years or more before applying for an emergency lease. They believed such elimination would encourage
speculation and the opening of new mines without sufficient reserves. The Interior
Department's decision to eliminate the two-year production criterion was based
on the following reasons:
The elimination of the two year requirement will not encourage speculation, but
rather will allow legitimate operators access to Federal coal where there is a need,
particularly in situations where the coal would have to be mined early in the
sequence of operations or else would be bypassed. No operator who opened a
mine with insufficient reserves in the expectation of acquiring a Federal lease
would be considered to have a legitimate need for the coal."
In addition, several commenters opposed the elimination of the criterion lim-

iting a mining operation to one emergency lease while others supported it. Those
opposing elimination believed such a change would encourage abuse of the emer-

gency leasing process and circumvent the competitive leasing program.16 Others
supporting such elimination argued that the move would help reduce the waste
46 Fed. Reg. 61,390-422 (1981).
. Id. at 61,396. With regard to the elimination of the provision that the applicant had to be
producing coal for two years prior to the application, the preamble stated:
It has been determined that the 2-year requirement is not needed and is potentially counterproductive and unnecessarily restrictive. Requiring the existence of a mine for which coal
reserves would be required at the time of the application should be sufficient to prevent
abuse of the emergency lease application process. There has been at least one instance where
an applicant failed to meet the 2-year operation requirement at the time the application
was filed. The application was denied and Federal coal was bypassed. The potential loss
of coal resources in scattered Federal sections necessitates this proposed change.
Id. at 61,397.
As to the elimination of the requirement of limiting bidding to applicants having an emergency
need for the coal, the preamble stated that
the existing regulations require all successful bidders for an emergency lease to have an emergency need and effectively limits most sales to one qualified bidder. By removing this requirement, the Department of the Interior expects an increased potential for competition for Federal
coal leased, especially with respect to small businesses.
Id. at 61,397-98.
"
6

47 Fed. Reg. 33,114-51.
Id. at 33,124.
d.
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of federal coal resources and introduce needed flexibility to the emergency leasing
process.5 7 The Interior Department justified elimination of the criterion by stating
that other provisions of the regulations provided sufficient safeguards to prevent
5
abuses to the competitive leasing process. 1

IV.

IssuEs

RELATED TO THE ADmINISTRATION OF EMERGENCY LEASING UNDER
CURRENT LAW

As previously mentioned, the Interior Department conducts emergency leasing
for the purpose of preventing the bypass of unleased federal coal and maintaining
production levels of operating mines. Although these objectives are appropriate
from a public policy perspective, certain issues have caused the Interior Department to encounter difficulties administering emergency leasing within the current

legal framework.5 9 These issues, often interrelated in the way they affect leasing
and mining decisions, include the following:
(1) The emergency leasing regulations, designed to avoid abuses to the emergency leasing process, require applicants to show a legitimate need for the
coal, but in doing so, limit leasing to situations in which competitive bidding
is unlikely to exist.

(2) Emergency lease tracts, because they are noncompetitive in nature, are of
little or no interest to other coal producers. As a result, their value on the
open market is low although they may have substantial economic value to
the applicant. Thus, competitive bidding procedures may not be appropriate

for emergency leasing situations since they do not assure that the government
will obtain a fair price for the coal.

57

Id.

5s Id.

5' Emergency federal coal leasing currently is governed by the following criteria:
(a) An emergency lease sale may be held in response to an application under this subpart
if the applicant shows:
(1) That the coal reserves applied for shall be mined as part of a mining operation
that is producing coal on the date of the application, and either:
(i) The Federal coal is needed within 3 years (A) to maintain an existing mining operation at its current average annual level of production on the date of application or (B)
to supply coal for contracts signed prior to July 19, 1979, as substantiated by a complete
copy of the supply or delivery contract, or both; or
(ii) If the coal deposits are not leased, they would be bypassed in the reasonably
foreseeable future, and if leased, some portion of the tract applied for would be used within
3 years; and
(2) That the need for the coal deposits shall have resulted from circumstances that
were ...

beyond the control of the applicant....

(b) The extent of any lease issued under this section shall not exceed 8 years of recoverable reserves at the rate of production under which the applicant qualified in paragraph
(a)(1) of this section. If the applicant qualifies under both subparagraphs (A) and (B) of
paragraph (a)(1) of this section, the higher rate applies.
43 C.F.R. § 3425.1-4 (1986).
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(3) Minimum royalty rates on federal coal leases, as required under the Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act of 1976, may be excessive and adversely
affect the development of federal coal lands. A case in point is Appalachia,
where the federal government's coal holdings are small and interspersed with
private coal lands having lower royalty rates.
A.

Regulations Limit Leasing to Noncompetitive Situations

The emergency leasing criteria limit leasing to situations in which competitive
interest in a proposed lease tract is unlikely to occur. To enable the Interior
Department to respond quickly to the unique leasing needs of operating mines,
planning for emergency lease sales must be applied site-specifically, rather than
on a regional basis, as practiced under the competitive leasing process.6" For example, of the sixty emergency lease sales conducted through September 1986, thirtyseven were held for the purpose of preventing the bypass of federal coal and the
loss of royalty revenue to the government. The other twenty-three lease sales were
held to provide existing operations additional reserves so they could maintain current production levels and avoid mine disruptions.
Table 3
SUMMARY OF EMERGENCY LEASE TRACTS OFFERED
BY TRACT TYPE
MARCH 1977 - SEPTEMBER 1986

Total

Production
Maintenance

Year

Bypass

Total

1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986

1
2
8
7
2
1
2
1
11
2

1
4
6
2
5
3
1
0
0
1

2
6
14
9
7
4
3
1
11
3

37

23

60

Source: Bureau of Land Management, Department of the Interior.

w

See 2 FED. COAL MGirr. PROGRAM (1979), supra note 15, at 112.
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Of the sixty emergency tracts offered at public auctions, fifty leases have been
issued and another was in the process of being issued. Forty-seven, or ninety-two
percent of these fifty-one leases, attracted one bidder-the applicant-and the
other four attracted more than one bidder. In these four auctions, the applicant
requesting the sale was the highest bidder and obtained the lease. Nine auctions
resulted in leases not being issued for various reasons. In five of the nine cases,
BLM rejected the applicant's bids on the grounds that they were for less than
fair market value. In one lease sale, the sole bidder, the applicant, refused to
accept the lease because the sale was delayed and the applicant had bypassed the
federal coal. And, in three cases, the applicants or other parties did not bid on
the proposed leases.
1. Application must be from an Existing Operation
Current emergency criteria require that the applicant be producing coal at the
time of application and that the requested coal lands be mined as a part of the
applicant's operation. The lease must be needed to maintain current production
6
or avoid the bypass of federal coal. 1
Supporters of emergency leasing view such leasing as serving a particular
public interest, that is, emergency leases maintain ongoing operations and avoid
the loss of resources, and generally must be developed within a limited time period. 62 They also point out that because emergency leases serve a particular public
interest and are not acquired for speculative purposes, they are distinct from tracts
offered at regional competitive lease sales. Therefore, they believe emergency leases
should be excluded from diligent development requirements. 6a Diligent development provisions originally were aimed at eliminating speculation in federal coal
leases and increasing production from federal coal leases to reduce the nation's
dependence on foreign oil. 64
Emergency lease tracts, under the criteria, must be located next to an operating mine. 65 Thus, the applicant has an economic advantage over other bidders
who generally would have to incur substantial front-end costs, such as acquiring
an existing operation and property rights to nonfederal coal and overlying surfaces.
2. Three-Year Mining Requirement and Eight-Year Reserve Limits
The emergency criteria require that applicants for bypass and production
maintenance leases must start mining the coal within three years from the date

61

43 C.F.R. § 3425.1(a)(1)(i).
132 CONG. REc. S5704 (daily ed. May 8, 1986).

63

Id.

61

" H.R. REP. No. 628, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1986).
6343 C.F.R. § 3425.1(a)(1).
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of application.6 "Interior's rationale for adopting this 3-year production rule was
to discourage companies from creating 'artificial by-pass' [leasing situations
by] ... opening mines with insufficient reserves on nonfederal coal lands adjoining
unleased federal coal and then attempting to qualify for the federal coal under
the emergency leasing process." 67 The Department, however, believed that if an
applicant could show that it legitimately needed the coal within three years of
68
the application date, then holding an emergency lease could be a possibility.
When considering the long lead-time and substantial costs associated with opening
a new mine, it is reasonable to expect that few producers other than the applicant
would be able to start mining the emergency lease within three years of the application date. Thus, from an economic and technological standpoint, the applicant can be regarded as being in a superior competitive position relative to
other potential bidders in satisfying the three-year requirement. 69
In addition to the three-year production requirement, the emergency criteria
also limits the amount of coal leased to a production maintenance lease applicant.
The amount is limited to the equivalent of eight years of production, as determined
by the applicant's average annual rate of production. 0 This restriction was adopted
because the Interior Department believed that if it leased unlimited quantities of
reserves under the emergency process, coal companies would use emergency leasing
applications to avoid competitive bidding situations under the normal competitive
7
leasing program. 1
The emergency criteria, however, do not expressly limit the amount of coal
leased to an applicant requesting a bypass lease because the criteria do not specify
how the average annual level of production is to be determined for bypass lease
tracts.7 2 In the past, the Bureau of Land Management determined the average
level of production for bypass tracts in a manner similar to the practice used for
production maintenance tracts (i.e., the average annual level of production was
the average of the twelve months of production immediately preceding the application date). 73 The Bureau's position on this issue is that "[b]ecause the Regulations (at 43 CFR 3425.1-4) do not specify the manner in which the average
annual level of production for bypass tracts would be calculated, they do not

Id. at § 3425.1(a)(1)(i).
67 GAO, LEGISLATIVE CHANGES ARE NEEDED

10

To AurHoRIZE

(Aug. 2, 1984) [hereinafter cited as LEGIsLATm
"

EMERGENCY FEDERAL CoAL LEASING

CHmAGES].

Id.

19Id. at 11.
7- 43 C.F.R. § 3425.1(b).
7147 Fed. Reg. 33,124.
7 Bur. of Land Mgmt., Office of the Director, Memorandum, Medicine Bow Emergency Coal
Lease Application (May 29, 1985).
13Id. at 1.
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174

Competitive Bidding Procedures and Emergency Lease Tracts

The Interior Department has recognized the low value that emergency lease
tracts have on the open market and that competitive interest in these tracts is
unlikely to exist. 7 Because such tracts usually contain relatively limited quantities
of coal and are situated next to an operating mine, they are not capable alone
of supporting a new operation independent of the adjacent operator. Furthermore,
since the objective of emergency leasing is to respond to the unique needs of
existing mines rather than to make lease tracts available that may be of interest
to the general market, few, if any, producers other than the applicants would be
inclined to bid for emergency leases. Therefore, the Interior Department's use of
competitive bidding for awarding emergency leases may not be an appropriate
way of awarding these tracts when only the applicant is able to mine the coal.
In its study of emergency leasing, the General Accounting Office questioned
whether the Interior Department's emergency leasing regulations and process comply with the statutory requirement that leases be issued on the basis of competitive
bidding. 76 The GAO report stated that:
Specifically, what is brought into question is the legality of a procedure which
permits bidding by any otherwise qualified bidder but limits leasing to situations
in which the applicant has such a clear economic and competitive advantage over
other potential bidders as to make the competitive bid process illusory?
Nonetheless, the Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act of 1976 mandates
that all federal coal leases are to be awarded by competitive bidding.7 Consequently, the law does not provide an alternative to competitive bidding for awarding emergency leases. As a result, the Interior Department has experienced
difficulties appraising emergency leases awarded by competitive bidding.
1. Appraising Emergency Lease Tracts
In the past, the Interior Department relied on public auctions to attract bidding competition and lease appraisals to set minimum acceptable lease prices in

74 Id. at 2. For example, if another year with production greater than the immediately preceding
year was used to compute the amount of coal to be included in a bypass tract, it is possible that an
applicant could qualify for, and be awarded, a bypass lease containing a greater amount of coal
without violating the emergency criteria.
7S Bur. of Land Mgmt., Office of the Director, Memorandum, Background Material Relating
to Fair Market Value for Federal Coal Leases (July 22, 1983).
76

See LEGISLAnVa CANoEs, supra note 67, at 12.

n Id.

1-30 U.S.C. § 201(a).
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implementing the statutory mandate of assuring the receipt of fair market value.7 9
In the context of emergency leasing, however, almost all lease sales to date have
attracted only one bidder, the applicant requesting the lease sale. Thus, such
noncompetitive circumstances have caused the Interior Department to rely on
appraisals to obtain fair market value for emergency leases.
Some of the most difficult appraisal issues arise because of situations involving
one seller (the government) and one buyer (the operator situated next to the
offered coal tract).80 Market structures of this type are referred to as bilateral
monopolies. 8' Economic theory provides no precise answers as to how the division
of economic rent will be shared between the buyer and the seller under conditions
of bilateral monopoly. s2 Theoretically, the sharing of economic rent can vary
substantially with the bargaining power and negotiating skills of the individual
parties.
When market imperfections limit leasing interest to a single firm, the bid
received in an auction may not be a meaningful estimate of the tract's true economic value. 3 The share of economic rent captured by the government is likely
to be small. Furthermore, the economic rent associated with a tract may be captured by a monopolist or monopsonist in other ways.8 4 For example, this could
occur if surface owner consent is difficult or costly to obtain; market access is
controlled by an aggressive price-discriminating transportation monopolist, or the
85
coal is under monopsonistic control by a utility.
Over the years, the Interior Department has used various appraisal methods
of setting minimum acceptable bids for emergency lease tracts, as measures of
increasing the likelihood of successful lease sales, i.e., receiving fair market value
in situations in which competition was unlikely to occur.8 6 In 1982, the Interior

supra note 1, at 243.
tO See Gulley, The FairMarket Value of Federal Coal, 86 W. VA. L. REv. 741 (1984); REPORT
,1 REPORT OF THE COMM'N,

OF THE CoMM'N, supra note 1; BUR. OF LAND MGrr., FnAL REPORT AND RECOmmENDATIONS FOR

THE SECRETARY ON FAIr MARKET VALUE AND MNmitmi ACCEPTABLE Bins FOR FEDERAL COAL LEASES
(Dec. 1979); LEoIsLATnrE CHANGES, supra note 67 and infra note 117.
11 J.M. HENDERSON & R.E. QUANDT, MICROECONOmc THEORY 244-49 (2d ed. 1971).
2 REPORT OF THE COMM'N, supra note 1, at 268. Economic rent is a concept from microeconomic
theory. It refers to compensation of factors of production in excess of the level necessary (i.e., the
opportunity cost) to keep the factors in the present occupation.
11 Rothkopf & McGuire, Assessment of Negotiation Options for Coal-Lease Sales (Aug. 23,

1985).
, Id.
85 Id. A recent study of the Wyoming coal markef measures the allocation of potential rent
earned by firms involved in the extraction, transportation, and consumption of low-sulfur Wyoming

coal. See Atkinson & Kerkvliet, Measuring the MultilateralAllocation of Rents: Wyoming Low-Sulfur
Coal, 17 RAND J. OF ECON. 416 (1986). The study indicates that railroads and coal producers each
capture about 23% of potential rent, while the State of Wyoming and purchasing utilities capture
7% and 47%, respectively. Id.
9 LEGISLATIVE CHANGES, supra note 67, at 17-19.
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Department adopted new coal appraisal and lease sale procedures8 7 requiring, in
part, sealed bidding and the offering of all tracts at a minimum bid of at least
of $100 (rather than $25) per acre.8" The Interior Department views such a regulatory minimum bid as a reservation price, bearing no relation to fair market
value.8 9 According to Bureau of Land Management records, fewer than half of
the winning bids at emergency sales held since 1979 were in excess of the regulatory
minimum bid. 90
2. Appraising the Incremental Value of Emergency Tracts to the Adjoining
Mine
The Commission on Fair Market Value Policy for Federal Coal Leasing was
critical of the Interior Department's coal lease appraisal function. 9' It found that
the Department had not accorded the coal appraisal function the high priority it
required, noting that Interior's appraisers were seriously handicapped by limited
training and inadequate resources. The Commission also reported that Interior's
appraisal methods-i.e., the comparable sales and income approaches-have never
been spelled out in a single document. 92 As a result, past appraisals suffered from
lack of uniformity and inadequate data and documentation.
In response to these criticisms, the Interior Department recently made several
improvements in its coal appraisal programs. For example, on the recommendation of the Commission, the Interior Department adopted a new guide to federal
coal property appraisal.93 A principal concern of the guide is the valuation of
federal coal property offered for lease by competitive bidding. It provides BLM
field personnel guidelines for performing appraisals to promote a uniform approach to federal coal property appraisal, and to encourage consistent and replicable application of standard appraisal procedures. One application of the guide
is in determining the adequacy of bids received at a coal lease sale.
The guide describes appraisal procedures for situations involving emergency
lease tracts in which a single tract constitutes an increment to an adjoining mine
operation.9 4 According to the guide, such a tract does not contain sufficient reserves to independently support a mining operation; however, the reserves can be
mined economically in conjunction with the existing mine. The guide calls for
such tracts to be appraised, or valued, according to their incremental value to

47 Fed. Reg. 33,123.
s Id.
89Id.
10 DOI, SECRETARIAL ISSUES DOCUMENT: FEDERAL COAL MG-T. PROGRAM
91 REPORT OF THE COMM'N,

11-134

(1986).

supra note 1, at 245-77.

9

Id. at 276.

13

BUR. OF LANDNMGMr., A GumE TO FEDERAL COAL PROPERTY APPRAISAL (1986).

Id. at 111-48-58.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol89/iss3/4

20

Pariser: Current Issues Relating to Emergency Federal Coal Leasing

1987]

EMERGENCY FEDERAL COAL LEASING

the adjoining operation. The incremental value of an emergency lease tract to an
adjoining mine can be estimated using the comparable sales and the income approaches, depending on the adequacy of available data. Basically, incremental
value represents the net present value added to the existing mine by the addition
95
of the federal lease tract.
The Interior Department's policy of appraising emergency leases according to
their value to the adjoining operator may seem reasonable, at least on the surface.
However, the value attributed to the federal property depends upon the adequacy
of geologic data for estimating reserves, timing of production occurring on federal
leases, mining costs and revenues over the life of the project, and the risk-adjusted
discount rate for reducing future cash flows to their present value. 96 These determinations, of course, are subject to considerable uncertainty, and involve many
assumptions and estimates, making it difficult to perform such appraisals before
conducting lease sales. 97 In addition, it is questionable whether the Interior Department is authorized under current law to appraise nonfederal land belonging
to an adjoining mine. 98
C. Federal Royalty Rates-Affect on Appalachian and Western Coal
Development
Royalty provisions of federal coal leases differ from those of fee coal leases
because of various statutory and administrative requirements.99 The Federal Coal
Leasing Amendments Act of 1976 requires lessees of surface-mined federal coal
to pay a minimum royalty rate of 12.5 percent of the value of the coal.' °° Under
the Act, the royalty rate on underground mined federal coal is left to the discretion
of the Secretary of the Interior and is currently eight percent.' 0'

', Id. at 111-50. Incremental value is determined by subtracting the net present value of the
existing mining operation, excluding the proposed federal lease, from its net present value when combined with the proposed federal lease. Id. Thus, incremental net present value represents the present
value added to the existing mine attributable to the adjacent federal coal property.
96 See GAO, IssuEs FACING THE FUTUmE OF FED. COAL LEASING (June 25, 1979); GAO, ADEQUACY

OF GEOLOGIC DATA FOR PROPOSED LEASE TRACTS IN CENTRAL UTAH AND WESTERN COLORADO

(Nov.

5, 1984).
1' See I.C.F., Inc., Final Report: Observations On Fair Market Value For Federal Coal Leases,
(Dec. 1979) (submitted to Department of the Interior Fair Market Value Task Force); and R.L.
GORDON, FEDERAL COAL LEASING POLICY: COMPETITION IN THE ENERGY INDUSTRIES 18-20 (1981).
91 See LEGISLATIVE CHANGES, supra note 67, at 33. See also GAO, MAPPING PROBLEMS MAY
UNDERMINE PLANS FOR NEW FED. COAL LEASING 57-58 (Dec. 12, 1980).
9' Errebo, Coal Royalties, 26 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INsT. 75, 104-05 (1980).
"' 30 U.S.C. § 207. Congress selected the 12.5% royalty on surface-mined coal because this rate
long had been the permissible minimum royalty for federal oil and gas. See R. NELSON, MAKING OF
FEDERAL COAL POLICY 225 (1983).
10144 Fed. Reg. 42,64748 (July 19, 1979).
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An important issue is whether the minimum royalty is excessive and, if so,
the extent to which it adversely affects the timing and efficiency of production
of federal coal leases. In some cases, federal coal leases are unprofitable to mine
because of the minimum royalty, thereby causing operators to deviate from an otherwise optimal production schedule by mining adjacent private coal lands available
at a lower royalty.I 2 The implication is that bidders at federal coal lease sales reduce
their bids or refuse to bid, opting to bypass unprofitable federal coal or shift production to nonfederal lands having lower royalty rates.
The impact of minimum royalty on federal coal is a major concern in Appalachia where the federal royalty rate exceeds royalty on private coal lands. 03
The federal government's coal holdings in Appalachia are small and scattered,
and coal production patterns in the region are not dependent on federal coal
lands. In contrast, in many parts of the West where the federal government has
a monopoly position in coal reserves, the prevailing royalty rate is set by the
federal government, causing owners of adjacent private coal lands to increase
their royalties to match the federal royalty. In Appalachia, federal coal leasing
generally occurs in areas where private coal is being developed adjacent to small
tracts of unleased federal coal having royalty rates below the federal minimum.
For example, Table 4 shows a comparison of private and federal coal royalty
rates in southern Appalachia in 1984. In 1985, none of the seventeen federal coal
4
leases in the southern Appalachian region reported any production10
Table 4
PRIVATE AND FEDERAL COAL ROYALTY RATES,
SOUTHERN APPALACHIA, 1984
Minerals Only

Surface Only

Type of Lease

(o0)

(5o0)

Minerals and Surface
(%)

Private
Federal

6-8
12.5

6-8
-

12-16
18.5-20.51

Includes the royalty paid to surface owners over federal minerals.
Source: Bureau of Land Management, Eastern States Office, Alexandria, Va.
1. Interior Department Coal Royalty Reduction Policy
Because the federal royalty in southern Appalachia exceeds private royalty
rates in the region, the Department of the Interior adopted a policy of encouraging
supra note 1, at 315.
Id.
101FED. COAL MGMT. REPORT: FIscAL YaAR 1985, supra note 6, at 53.
'G2 REPORT OF THE COM'N,
103
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lessees in the area, immediately after lease issuance, to apply for royalty reductions
to the level of the prevailing private rates in the region.10s The impact of the
federal minimum royalty was reviewed by the Commission on Fair Market Value
for Federal Coal Leasing which recommended that Congress give the Secretary
of the Interior administrative discretion to reduce federal royalty rates for coal
tracts prior to a lease sale when current royalties would have adverse effects on
production.'0 6 The Commission found that many bypass tracts are uneconomical
to mine because of the excessive federal royalty rate.
Furthermore, the Commission felt that the primary reason for royalty reductions should not be lessee "hardship," but rather should be for keeping federal
royalty rates competitive with surrounding private and state royalties.' °0 The Interior Department agrees with the Commission's recommendation.108 It believes
that administrative discretion to reduce federal royalty rates enhances competition
and bidding for many tracts which would not otherwise be bid upon.' °9
2.

Royalty Reduction Guidelines

On February 13, 1985, the Bureau of Land Management issued draft royalty
reduction guidelines for federal coal and other solid minerals."10 To date, BLM
has not issued final royalty reduction guidelines. The draft guidelines were issued
because previous guidelines were inadequate; they failed to clearly define the Interior Department's reduction policy and procedures and were inconsistently applied."'
The draft guidelines provide stringent criteria for the purpose of ensuring that
royalty reductions are granted only in those cases in which a reduction is required

,01
46 Fed. Reg. 28,956 (1981). The Interior Department's authority to grant reductions in federal
coal royalties is provided for in § 39 of the Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 1920, 30 U.S.C. § 209.
Royalty reductions can occur only after a lease sale is held and a lease has been issued. Section 39
provides that:
The Secretary of the Interior, for the purpose of encouraging the greatest ultimate recovery
of coal ... and in the interest of conservation of natural resources, is authorized to waive,
suspend, or reduce the rental, or minimum royalty, or reduce the royalty on an entire
leasehold, ... whenever in his judgment it is necessary to do so in order to promote
development, or whenever in his judgment the leases cannot be successfully operated under
the terms provided therein ....
Id.

supra note 1, at 319.
Id.
"I S. REP. No. 932, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 88 (1984).

106

REPORT OF THE CoMi'N,

'

109Id.
11

50 Fed. Reg. 6,062-65 (1985).
FOR GumANcE AND CONTROLS
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to allow continuing production. 1 2 For example, the guidelines state that:
A royalty reduction may be granted to prevent bypass [of federal coal] only where
it is shown in the application that alternative reserves are available at an economic
advantage. The applicant must conclusively demonstrate that mining the alternative reserves would provide a competitive profit advantage due to a royalty rate
differential compared to the lease upon which a royalty reduction [is sought].",
Recently, the House Interior Committee reviewed BLM's draft royalty reduction guidelines and concluded that the Interior Department should reexamine
the guidelines." 4 According to the Committee report, the guidelines limit the usefulness of section 39 as a remedy when circumstances exist which justify some
relief from the statutory minimum royalty rate." 5 In addition, the Committee
report noted that when the House was considering the 1976 coal leasing amendments, members expressed concern that the proposed minimum royalty of 12.5
percent could be too high in some cases. Assurances were given, however, that
the Secretary of the Interior could afford lessees relief in such circumstances under
section 39. The 12.5 percent minimum royalty was approved in reliance on those
assurances. 16

V. ALTERNATIVE LEASE SALE MECHANISMS FOR AWARDING EMERGENCY LEASES
Existing law governing federal coal leasing does not specifically authorize
emergency leasing or provide an appropriate lease sale mechanism to award emergency leases in a manner consistent with the circumstances. In view of the incompatibility between emergency leasing and the statutory requirement of
competitive bidding, researchers need to evaluate alternatives to competitive bidding for awarding emergency leases. One alternative approach would be for Congress to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to conduct emergency leasing and
to use negotiated lease sales, when appropriate, as a mechanism for awarding
emergency leases apart from the normal competitive leasing program. Such an
approach would introduce flexibility to the emergency leasing process and enhance
the Interior Department's ability to deal with the uncertainties related to estimating
the presale value of emergency leases.
A. GAO Study Recommending Negotiated Lease Sales-In the Context of the
Regional Leasing Program
In two recent studies, 1 7 the General Accounting Office discussed negotiated
lease sales as an alternative to competitive bidding in the context of the normal

132

DOI, News Release, BLM Seeks Comments On Royalty Reduction GuidelinesFor Solid Min-

erals (Feb. 14, 1985).
'"
See 50 Fed. Reg. supra note 110, at 6,064-65.
H.R..REP. No. 628, supra note 64, at 14-15.
" Id.
116

Id. at 14.

"7

See

LEGISLATIVE CHANGES,

supra note 67.
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competitive leasing program as well as under the emergency leasing process.
In reporting on the Powder River Basin coal lease sales in April and October
1982, the GAO reviewed coal development patterns surrounding federal lease tracts
in the lease sale areas of Wyoming and Montana." In planning the Powder River
lease sale, the Interior Department selected for competitive leasing several maintenance-type tracts of interest only to adjacent mines. Unlike lease tracts offered
under the emergency leasing regulations, production maintenance tracts offered
at regional sales are not subject to emergency criteria, even as to their size. Such
tracts are identified early in the planning process (two to three years before a
lease sale) so as to permit the necessary time for evaluation and consideration
for leasing. Because such maintenance tracts are of little or no competitive interest
to other companies, the GAO recommended that Congress amend the Mineral
Lands Leasing Act of 1920 to authorize the Interior Department to negotiate
maintenance-type leases offered at regionally scheduled sales when circumstances
justify negotiated sales.
The GAO report suggested that any negotiation approach should include strong
controls for ensuring adequate public participation and coal industry protection. 19
The principal advantage of negotiating production maintenance-type leases under
the approach suggested by GAO is the fairness of the negotiating process to all
parties concerned.1'0 Improved mining cost and revenue data, for example, could
help reduce many of the uncertainties presently troubling lease valuations to reasonable levels and result in more reliable information for making leasing decisions.'
B. GAO in Negotiated Lease Sales-In the Context of Emergency Leasing
Process
In its study on emergency leasing, GAO recommended that Congress amend
the Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 1920 to specifically authorize the Secretary of
the Interior Department to conduct emergency leasing and to authorize the Sec22
retary to use negotiated lease sale procedures for carrying it out.
Furthermore, the GAO study recommended that such legislation should provide for: (1) A statement of objectives to be achieved through emergency leasing;

"I GAO,

ANALYSIS OF THE POWDER RIVER BASIN FED. COAL LEASE SALE: ECONOMIC VALUATION

IMPROVEMENTS AND LEGISLATIVE CHANGES NEEDED (May 11,
"9

1983).

Id. at 74.

, Id. at 78.
I
Id. The GAO report points out that authority to negotiate captive tracts would appear to
broaden the Secretary of the Interior's discretion in determining the reasonableness of prices paid for
federal coal. However, it notes that with improved valuation data, the Department's latitude in these
matters may actually decrease. Id. at 78-79.
"I See LEGISLATWE CHANGEs, supra note 67, at 30.
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(2) an opportunity for public comment and expressions of competitive leasing
interest before conducting negotiated sales; (3) development of guidelines by the
Secretary of the Interior for negotiators to follow which, at a minimum, would
provide for access to economic and geologic data, disclosure and protection of
proprietary information, factors to consider in negotiating lease terms and reasonable value for the federal coal, and public disclosure of lease sale results; and
(4) promulgation of regulations by the Secretary of the Interior for designing and
implementing an emergency coal leasing program consistent with its objectives
and the above standards.12
The GAO report points out the importance of the distinction between leasing
situations occurring under the regional leasing process, which takes three to five
years to complete, and those occurring under the emergency leasing process, which
takes place on short notice. Such a distinction is important because the two processes differ in their objectives, timing, and procedures for screening and offering
lease tracts. In view of this distinction, negotiation objectives and procedures
suitable for tracts offered at regional sales may not be appropriate for awarding
federal coal leases under emergency leasing situations.
C. The Commission on Fair Market Value for Federal Coal Leasing and
Negotiated Coal Lease Sales
In its report to Congress in 1984, the Commission on Fair Market Value
Policy for Federal Coal Leasing recommended that the Interior Department should
have statutory authority to negotiate a fair price for bypass and production maintenance coal leases when reasonable efforts to obtain competitive bids have failed. 24
The Commission also recommended that such tracts should be appraised in terms
of value to the adjoining operator rather than value in the open market.12, Two
significant factors influenced the Commission's decision to recommend negotiated
coal lease sales: fragmentation of mineral and surface rights which reduce competition for federal leases, and the Interior Department's procedures for leasing
bypass and production maintenance lease tracts. 2 6
In regard to the fragmentation of mineral and surface rights as a factor limiting competition for federal coal leases, the Commission stated that:
Due to ownership patterns and other factors, the Government seldom reaps the
benefit of being able to offer all the mineral rights needed for an entire economic
mining unit. Were the Government able to do so, it could guarantee to each
potential bidder an opportunity to invest in a lease without uncertainty about
whether additional private rights could be acquired, and at what cost, after the

2

Id.

'24 REPORT OF THE

"I Id. at 273.
12

Colm'N, supra note 1, at 234.

Id. at 231-32.
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lease sale. Typically, however, economic mining units consist of private, State,
or previously leased Federal coal interspersed with or adjacent to the Federal lease
tract. In other instances the Government may own the coal mineral rights while
a private party owns the surface. Frequently the net result of all this is to reduce
the field of potential competitors to one dominate bidder who-through ownership
of adjoining
land and minerals or rights to them-holds the Federal tract
"captive." 27
In the case of bypass and production maintenance leases, the Commission
observed that the Interior Department's leasing procedures resemble negotiations.
The Commission report stated that:
For example, setting a minimum bid at the reservation price on a maintenance
or bypass tract to be offered for sealed bidding is similar to an opening offer in
a negotiation. Submission of a sealed bid amounts to acceptance of the offer.
Receipt of no bid means rejection of the offer in hopes of a new offer. Use of
a minimum bid substantially below the reservation price while keeping the reservation price confidential is like opening a negotiation by forcing the other party
to make an offer first. Rejection of a bid followed by reoffering parallels the
rejection of the first offer in a negotiation.'2
Competition for bypass leases is unusual because of the small size of the
tracts and their location in the midst of an ongoing mine. Production maintenance
tracts, on the other hand, are designed either to extend the life of an adjoining
mine, or to permit expansion of the coal mine's annual production. 129 The Commission noted that the only hope of competition for such tracts would be from
parties who think they can negotiate a better price with the adjoining operator
than the government would accept through its lease sale procedures. The Commission concluded that if any profit is to be made from negotiation it would be
better for them to be realized by the government rather than by speculators.
Thus, the Commission concluded that there might be situations in which negotiation would facilitate the leasing of federal coal. Of concern to the Commission, however, was public mistrust of negotiated lease sales and the ability of
the Interior Department to establish negotiation procedures that would earn
public confidence. 30
The Commission also found that many, if not most, private coal lease
transactions are arrived at through negotiation rather than auctions. 3 ' In addition to the Commission's findings, a recent article published by the Eastern

27

Id. at 155.

' Id. at 231.

Id. at 161.
'7Id. at 233.
'7' Id. at 231.
'
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Mineral Law Foundation discusses concepts introduced during coal lease negotiations between private parties. 3 2 The article considers numerous contractual
issues affecting the lessor and lessee and the economic and regulatory environment in which the coal is mined and sold.
Subsequent to the Commission's report, four bills were introduced in the
99th Congress to amend the Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act in several
ways. One provision of three of the four bills authorized the Secretary of the
Interior to negotiate the sale of bypass and production maintenance coal lease
tracts on an experimental basis. 33 The bills also required the Interior Department to publish regulations governing experimentation within six months of
the date of enactment.
D. The Interior Department's Response to the Commission's
Recommendation on Negotiated Lease Sales
On April 5, 1984, the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources
held hearings on the Commission's report, at which time Secretary William P.
Clark presented the Interior Department's initial response to the Commission's
report and recommendations. 3 4 With regard to the recommendation of authorizing the Interior Department to negotiate a fair price for federal coal
leases, Secretary Clark stated that important public policy concerns make negotiation less than desirable. His reasons were similar to those expressed by
the Commission (i.e., public trust and the ability of the Interior Department
to establish a workable negotiation procedure, and charges of inside dealings).,
Subsequently, on March 19, 1984, the Interior Department released a report
including Secretary Clark's formal responses to the Commission's recommendations.1 6 As to the issue of negotiated lease sales, the report noted that Secretary Clark accepted the Commission's recommendation in principle. The
Secretary also agreed to work with Congress to determine whether a feasible
approach for negotiating the sale of single bid (i.e., captive) tracts could be
defined.
To initiate discussion with Congress and the public, the report outlined three
conceptual approaches to negotiating the sale of federal coal leases. In a subsequent Federal Register notice, the Interior Department requested public comments on the negotiation concept, the three negotiated lease sale approaches, and

Vish, Private Coal Leases, 6 E. MN. L. FouND. 2-1 (1985).'
The three bills introduced in the 99th Congress, Ist session, containing provisions relating to
negotiated federal coal lease sale authority were H.R. 1898, S. 372, and S. 570.
14 S. HRG. No. 932, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 81-82 (1984).
13 Id.
136DOI, REvaiw or FE. CoAL LEASINC (Mar. 19, 1984).
332
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issues related to their implementation. 3 7 Conceptually, negotiation could be entered into directly or after a lease sale is held. Of the three approaches identified
in the notice, only the first avoids a competitive sale and represents a direct
negotiation. The others are slight variations of the normal competitive sale procedure but would be useful in situations in which the only bid received is below
the predetermined amount. To introduce adequate flexibility to the leasing process,
the Secretary of the Interior should have authority to use all three approaches.
In the first approach, the government would identify the tract which it expected to be of interest to only one bidder. The government would then announce
in the FederalRegister its intent to negotiate with the identified company for that
tract unless it received indications from other companies of their intention to
submit bids. If no bids were received, the government and the identified coal
company would negotiate a final price for the tract. This price would be published
and higher bids would be solicited. If any company indicated an intention to bid,
the government would drop its intention to negotiate, and offer the tract at a
lease sale, awarding the lease to the highest bidder, providing the bid represented
fair market value.'38
The second approach provided that the tract would be offered in a competitive
sale with an undisclosed value approximating the full value of the lease tract to
the adjoining operator. If the tract received only one bid and if the bid were
under the undisclosed value, the government and the bidder would negotiate a
price through a post-sale process operated similarly to that used by the government
for awarding contracts. The lease would be awarded if a sale panel approved the
negotiated result."'
Under the third approach, the tract would be offered in a competitive sale
with an undisclosed value approximating the full value of the lease tract to the
adjoining operator. After initial bids were submitted, the sale panel would announce a preliminary decision to accept or reject the high bid. The sale would
be kept open and the preestablished value would remain undisclosed. The highest
bidder would be allowed one opportunity to adjust his bid. After this opportunity,
40
the sale would close.

VI.

NEGOTIATION ISSUES IDENTIFIED BY THE INTERIOR DEPARTMENT

A Department of the Interior staff study identified various issues and policy
implications related to the previously discussed negotiated lease sale options. The

Fed. Reg. 43,935-37
Id. at 43,936.
49

"3

(Oct. 31, 1984).

139Id. at 43,936-37.
141

Id. at 43,937.
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based on public comments
staff study also addressed implementation issues, partly
4
received in response to the Federal Register notice.' '
A fundamental issue is whether the Secretary of the Interior should support
the granting of authority from Congress to negotiate the sale of federal coal leases.
Basically, if such authority is not granted by Congress, the other issues relating
to implementation would not arise. The staff study identified seven implementation issues.142 These issues include:
(1) Degree and timing of public participation (e.g., public participation could
occur at the beginning, throughout, or at the end of the negotiation process);
(2) types of negotiation,'4 3 (i.e., (a) cooperative negotiation in which representatives of the Interior Department and a coal company negotiate a fair
price for a federal coal lease tract; (b) bargaining, in which each side tries
to drive the other side's minimum price up or down, using bargaining strategies
and tactics to do so; and (c) binding or nonbinding arbitration);
(3) the mechanism that should be used to initiate the negotiation process
(e.g., company applications, Interior Department selection of lease tracts considered appropriate for negotiated lease sales, Regional Coal Team selection
of lease tracts, or some combination of these);
(4) whether the Interior Department should negotiate with more than one
applicant at the same time;
(5) the degree of reliance that should be placed on presale appraisals in determining a fair price for the coal;
(6) whether the high bid submitted in a negotiated lease sale should or should
not be binding; and
(7) whether the competition should be by sealed or oral bidding, in the event
more than one party is interested in negotiating with the government for a
particular lease tract.
VII.

INTERIOR DEPARTMENT'S POLICY OPTION ON SEEKING NEGOTIATED LEASE

SALE AUTvioRi

Y FROM CONGRESS

As to the issue of whether the Secretary of the Interior should seek authority
from Congress to negotiate the sale of federal coal leases, the Departmental staff
study identified three policy options for secretarial decision making. The policy
options include:

1'
142

FED. COAL MGoiTr. PROGRAM (1986), supra note 2, at 11-54, 111-133.
Id. at 11-133, [1-143.

14 See H. RAiFEA, TnE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION (1982).
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(1) Support the granting of negotiation authority by Congress and propose
a specific negotiation method;
(2) support the granting of negotiation authority without proposing a specific
method; or
144
(3) do not support the granting of negotiation authority.

A. Option 1: Support for Congressional Grant of Negotiation AuthorityProposal of a Specific Method
Under the first option, the Interior Department would support the granting
of negotiated lease sale authority from Congress, and provide a suggested negotiation method. Basically, this option would implement the recommendation of
the Commission on Fair Market Value Policy for Federal Coal Leasing. According

to the staff study, the Department would probably suggest a negotiation approach
based on BLM's experience in negotiating fee title and lease exchanges involving
federal coal.' 45 These exchanges represent the Department's only experience negotiating coal leases under current law.

With regard to BLM's current negotiation procedures for exchanges involving
coal, the staff study states that:
In current exchange negotiations the BLM estimates the land's market value by
obtaining from the exchange proponent and other sources detailed information
about the tract to be given to the Government and the tract to be given to the
exchangee. Negotiations are conducted over the geologic and mining information
to be used in the appraisal process and the conduct of the appraisal itself, not
over the land values determined by the evaluation process. The rationale is that
if both parties can agree on the factors to be considered in the appraisals and
on the appraisal method itself, then both parties automatically agree to accept
the results of the appraisals.
The appraisals are conducted using A Guide to Federal Coal Property Appraisal.
The exchange proponent's information is considered and used where the BLM
finds it to be an improvement. The appraisal values themselves are not subject
6
to negotiation.1
This option offers the advantage of allowing the Interior Department and
others that would be affected by negotiated coal lease sales to design feasible
(1986), supra note 2, at 11-145-49.
at 11-55. Coal lease exchange procedures are codified at 43 C.F.R. § 3435 (1985). Fee
title exchanges are authorized by section 206 of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of
'" FED. COAL MGZAT. PROGRAM
141 Id.

1976. Coal lease exchanges must be authorized by specific statute because the Federal Coal Leasing
Amendments Act of 1976 abolished the Secretary's general authority to issue federal coal leases noncompetitively.
' FED. COAL MGMT. PROGRAM (1986), supra note 2, at 11-143.
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negotiation methods. On the other hand, the option has its drawbacks. The chosen
method may not be the most appropriate one because information may be limited
at the time of the decision to negotiate. 147 Furthermore, some believe that no
procedure based on pure negotiation would work because all results would be
suspect unless verified by a follow-up lease sale to determine the existence or
48
/
absence of competition.
B. Option 2: Support for Congressional Grant of Negotiation Authority-No
Specific Method Proposed
The second option would require the Secretary of the Interior to inform Congress that the Department supports the granting of authority to negotiate coal
lease sales. The Department also would identify at least one feasible negotiation
method, but it would not necessarily be an advocate of the method. 149 The Department, however, would continue to work with Congress on the negotiation
issue, conducting additional studies of negotiation methods.
The advantage of this option is that it allows ample time for the Interior
Department to review thoroughly issues and concerns related to the negotiation
of captive federal coal lease tracts. 50 In addition, it could help the Interior Department improve negotiation procedures currently use~l in processing coal land
and lease exchanges. A disadvantage of this option is! that it would require additional time, money, and personnel to carry it out.",'
C.

Option 3: No Support for Congressional Grant of Negotiation Authority

Under the third option of not supporting the authority to negotiate the sale
of federal coal leases, the staff study identified t iree advantages. First, recent
changes made to the Department's coal lease app aisal and sale procedures have
been designed to ensure the receipt of fair market value for captive lease tracts,
making negotiation redundant. Second, it is umertain that negotiation would result in increased mineral leasing revenues. Basdd on past experience, negotiations
can be costly and lengthy, especially if the parties become involved in litigation.
Third, the option could help eliminate the public perception that the Interior
Department sells coal leases for captive tracts at prices less than their worth.'
On the other hand, the Interior staff study identified three disadvantages
associated with this option. First, its selection by the Interior Department could

'7 Id. at 56. See also GAO,
How INTERIOR SHOULD HANDLE CONGRESSIONALLY AUTHORIZED
COAL LEASE EXCHANGES (Aug. 10, 1982).
I" Id. at 55-56.
,,9
Id. at 56.
I" Id.

Id.

152

Id. at 56-57.
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be taken to mean that the Department is backing away from its efforts to eliminate
the perception that captive federal coal lease tracts are being given away at lease
sales. Second, its selection would require the Interior Department to oppose pending legislation. Third, its selection could be interpreted by some to indicate a
reversal of the Department's recognition of and responses to the recommendation
Value Policy for Federal Coal Leases regarding
of the Commission on Fair 15Market
3
negotiated coal lease sales.
On February 21, 1986, Secretary of the Interior Donald Hodel selected this
supporting the granting of coal lease sale negotiation authority
third option of not
54
from Congress.
VIII.

LAWREN CE BERKELEY LABORATORY STUDY ON NEGOTIATED COAL LEASE
SALE OPTIONS

In a recent study, the Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory addressed issues related
to negotiated coal lease sale options.'

The study focused on the captive coal

lease tract situation, in which a federal coal tract is of substantial value to only
one private party, and the government is unlikely to obtain more than one bid.
The report acknowledges that estimating the value of such tracts is difficult, particularly in view of the quality of government information about tract value.
The study analyzes negotiations as an alternative to competitive sales and
identifies a number of situations in which negotiations of an appropriate kind
could be advantageous. The report's analysis applies various criteria in evaluating
negotiation alternatives, including economic efficiency, government revenue, fairness, and administrative workability. The report concludes that there are advantageous ways for the government to negotiate federal coal leases when there is
only one serious bidder for a lease. One way examined would be for the Interior
Department to negotiate coal lease exchanges that give the government an economically logical potential mine that could be sold competitively at a future lease
sale. For some other one-bidder lease tracts, the report concludes that there are
potential advantages to coal lease negotiations, provided that all negotiations are
tentative subject to "validation" of their one-bidder nature in a post-negotiation
formal lease sale process.
The report suggests that the Interior Department should develop a negotiation
program, but limit it to cases in which competition is highly unlikely, such as
bypass and maintenance leases. Furthermore, the report notes that development
of such a program would require new legislation and new regulations. The report
identifies what it considers to be the major components of such a negotiation

"

Id. at 57.

114Id. at DS-7
"I See Rothkopf & McGuire, supra note 83.
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program. The report states that:
First, the program should have a defined scope. Based on our analysis, negotiated sales should be limited to cases in which competition is highly unlikely.
All by-pass and maintenance leases are good candidates for negotiation.
Second, the program should have a clear goal. This should be to obtain both
the substance and appearance of fair market value for leases through using negotiation to create competitive and other incentives for bidders to offer fair market
value. For a negotiation program to work, industry cannot be leased all the coal
in which it expresses interest. While satisfying national requirements for coal remains a valid goal, satisfying individual company objectives cannot be one.116
IX.

FUTURE RESEARCH NEEDS-NEGOTIATED COAL LEASE SALES AND RELATED
IssuEs

Many of the issues discussed in this Article are in need of resolution. In view
of coal development patterns of existing mines, emergency leasing probably will
continue to be a major coal leasing activity for many years into the future. The
issues, therefore, will be of continuing interest to Congress, the coal industry,
and the Department of the Interior. Thus, researchers need to direct their attention
to these public policy issues and their implications.
Future research efforts should examine relationships among various issues
affecting emergency leasing. For example, an area worthy of consideration relates
to the objectives and scope of any negotiation process, for emergency leasing and
for the competitive leasing program as well. Should negotiation processes be narrowly or broadly defined: What effect would this have on the construction of
lease terms such as royalty rates and other factors? Closely related to this area
is the need for experimental negotiated lease procedures and regulations along
the lines proposed in several bills introduced in the 99th Congress. 57 How should
such experimental procedures be designed and implemented, and to what extent
should regional differences in mining patterns, land ownership, and other such
considerations be taken into account? And, to what extent should the Interior
Department's current procedures for negotiating exchanges involving coal leases
serve as guidelines for developing general lease negotiation procedures?
X.

CONCLUSION

Emergency federal coal leasing evolved from an interim measure to a major
component of the Interior Department's federal coal leasing program. Such leasing
is recognized as being in the public interest. If past events are any indication of

"5

Id. at 25.

, See supra note 134.
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the future of federal coal leasing, emergency leasing may become the primary
type of leasing, particularly in view of the uncertainty surrounding the future of
the competitive leasing program and the coal development patterns associated with
existing mines dependent on adjacent federal coal lands. Many of the issues discussed relate to the basic conflict between the objectives of emergency leasing and
the requirements under current law governing federal coal leasing. Since emergency
leasing is noncompetitive in nature, competitive bidding is not an appropriate
lease sale mechanism for administering such leasing. Alternatively, negotiated lease
sales would be a more appropriate lease sale mechanism in the context of emergency leasing.
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